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SINCE THE REPAYMENT of no loan is absolutely certain, pri-
vate credit institutions cannot avoid measuring the risks of
lending, nor can they avoid adopting a policy regarding the
amount of risk they are willing to assume. As a practical mat-
ter, this involves, first, the adoption of credit standards by
reference to which applications for loans may be tested, and
second, the use of credit appraisal methods in order to de-
termine whether requests for loans meet these standards.1
Commercial banks, life insurance companies, and public
agencies extending medium-term credit to business concerns
have gradually developed specially trained personnel and
unique credit standards, along with methods of appraising
and limiting term loan risks. The factors that determine the
probability of repayment of a term loan differ markedly from
those pertaining to a personal loan, a residential mortgage or
other forms of credit. Moreover, the large size of individual
term loans means that lenders cannot rely upon diversifica-
tion to any considerable extent to limit their risks, but must
attempt to compensate for this by the care with which they
scrutinize each loan application.
Organization and Personnel
Very few commercial banks have set up separate depart-
ments or divisions charged with the functions of
making and controlling all term loans originating in the bank.2
It may also entail the provision of reserves, set aside out of income from
loans, against which "normal" losses may be charged.
2Amonga large number of banks located in leading financial centers east
of the Mississippi River, whose officers were interviewed by the writers, only
one had concentrated all term lending functions in a separate department.
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A number of banks have approximated this form of organiza-
tion by placing a senior officer in charge of all term credits,
with the duty of supervising and passing upon term loans
originating with other officers. But the majority of American
banks that are large enough to have developed a need for
specialization of their business loan functions have divided
their territories into geographical areas, one of whichis
assigned to each loan officer. A few large banks organize
their business loans on an industrial basis, or combine an in-
dustrial with a geographical basis of organization. Whatever
method of organization is used, it is generally true that ap-
plicants for term loans and seasonal loans will deal with the
same loan officer. In short, banks have preferred to adapt
their existing organizations to term lending rather than to
create new divisions.
This fact does not indicate that bank managements fail to
recognize any peculiarity in the credit problems posed by term
loans. Many institutions have created special statistical or re-
search departments for the analysis of applications for term
loans. It is significant that in some cases these credit analyses
are assigned to the analytical units connected with the bond or
trust departments of the bank, rather than to the regular
credit department.3 This is evidence of a recognition that term
loans should be judged by standards and analyzed by methods
appropriate to investments rather than to short-term loans.
As may be inferred from the general absence of special
organization for term lending by commercial banks, the per-
sonnel engaged in this work consists mainly of regular bank
loan officers. The majority of banks that have systematically
entered the term loan market on a substantial scale have, how-
ever, recruited personnel with investment banking experience.
As one experienced bank officer put it, "a special attitude of
mind is necessary in making term loans." Many individuals
formerly associated with the securities affiliates of large banks
Several banks reported to the writers a plan to merge their credit depart-
ments with their departments of statistics and analysis, as a result of expansion
of their activities in term lending. This is evidence of a shift in emphasis in
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arenow engaged in term loan operations. Some banks have
also drawn upon former officers and security analysts of in-
vestment banking houses for skills useful in extending longer
term credits. Certain banks have employed full time, or re-
tained on a part-time basis, management engineers, marketing
consultants, geologists, petroleum engineers, or other types of
experts to aid them in sifting loan applications. Expert per-
sonnel has been employed with greatest frequency by banks
with heavy interests in term loans to oil producers.
Methods of Acquiring Loans
It is probable that the majority of banks having term loans
in their portfolios at the end of 1940 did not actively solicit
them. The loans were created primarily as a result of requests
of borrowers, or in consequence of suggestions made by bank-
ers to borrowers who came to the bank expecting to obtain
traditional short-term credit. This implies the existence of
more pressure on the demand than on the supply side of the
term loan market. Advertising and personal solicitation of
prospective term borrowers has been confined to a compara-
tively few banks in large cities, but these have been among
the most active term lenders. Several of these banks have
systematically scrutinized financial statements and other infor-
mation pertaining to businesses contemplating expansion or
having high-coupon debt or preferred stock outstanding. Then,
through a traveling representative, they have tried to interest
these concerns in negotiating term loans. Such activities re-
semble those of the buying departments of investment bank-
ing houses which aim to maintain contact with all concerns
likely to require financing.
Many bankers view aggressive loan solicitation with dis-
favor. They argue that debts actively invited are likely to be
of inferior quality. This conclusion does not necessarily follow.
A soliciting bank may very well acquire loans of unquestion-
able merit that would otherwise have been made by competing
banks or financing agencies, .or never have been made at all
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that it does not relax its credit standards or compromise the
thoroughness of its credit investigations.
Formation of Loan Agreements
Practically all term loanscommerical banks embody, or
are accompanied by, an agreement between borrower and
lender that contains covenants by the debtor to conduct his
business in .prescribed ways and defines the conditions of the
loan. Agreements usually contain both positive promises of
the borrower to perform specific acts, and "negative pledge"
clauses not to perform other acts. Although these agreements
resemble articles contained in mortgage indentures pertaining
to corporate bond issues, they usually go much farther in re-
stricting the conduct of the borrower. Indeed, the compre-
hensiveness with which borrowers' actions are hedged about
is one of the distinguishing features of term lending. It is the
device lenders have used to offset the additional uncertainties
inevitably present in credits running for medium instead of
short terms.
It is felt that the most effective protection of the lender's
interests is found not in the real estate, chattels, receivables,
or inventory that may be hypothecated, but in the loan agree-
ment that sets up financial and other conditions to be main-
tained by the borrower and automatically' accelerates the
maturity of the loan in case of violation. Under such arrange-
ments the lender incurs the trouble and expense of taking
liens on assets if the maturity of the loan is accelerated.
National banks are surrounded by such restrictions on real
estate loans that they prefer not to acquire them. Neither do
most borrowers wish to incur the cost and publicity attendant
upon the drawing up and recording of real estate mortgages.
In short, the taking of any collateral security entails costs, and
the acquisition of real estate mortgages involves especially
large costs, which both lender and borrower desire to avoid
if possible.
A consideration of the provisions usually contained in term
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volved. Term loans are generally made to enable borrowers
to carry out specific programs, and agreements are therefore
"tailor made" to fit the circumstances of each case. As few
lending agencies make use of stereotyped forms, the great
variety of provisions that may be found in loan agreements
makes summary difficult.4
Provisions Relating to Use of Funds
The majority of agreements made with commercial banks do
not tie the borrower down with respect to use of funds arising
from the loan, although bank officers customarily know the
purposes for which loan proceeds will be used. In contrast to
instalment sales financing, term loans are "general purpose"
credits, although provisions of the loan agreement may imply
limitations on what the borrower does with funds coming into
his hands. Term loan agreements made with the Federal Re-
serve banks and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation gen-
erally contain rather specific restrictions on the uses of the
loan proceeds, undoubtedly because of the impaired financial
conditions of many of the borrowers, and because the statutes
under which these agencies operate limit the purposes for
which loans may be made.
Provisions Concerning the Incurring of Indebtedness
Term loan agreements commonly specify a maximum amount
of term credit that may be outstanding at any one time—that
is, the maximum loan authorization together with a schedule
of repayments. Infrequently, the loan agreement sets up a "line
of credit" for the borrower for a specific term of years. About
5 percent of the number and aggregate amount of term loans
are revolving credits with fluctuating outstanding indebted-
ness. Other controls of debt found in the majority of loan
agreements include prohibitions against incurring any long-
term indebtedness (except with permission of the lending bank)
An excellent list of the provisions commonly contained in term loan agree-
ments, based upon study of a large number of such agreements, may be found
in Albert Wagenfuehr, Term Loans by Commercial Banks (Robert Morris
Associates, Philadelphia, 1940)Pp. 27-30.it would have if it took mortgages on real
sets of the borrower, it is protective in th
vents others from obtaining prior claims
assets. It will be observed that this usually
concerns free, within limits, to borrow for
short-term purposes, and in fact they do so
agreement may prohibit the borrower from
tingent liabilities, such as guaranteeing the
subsidiary.
Provisions Concerning Financial Conditions
estate or other as-







Among the most frequent provisions appearing in term loan
agreements, and perhaps the most important from a credit
standpoint, are those calling for maintenance of the current
ratio, as defined in the loan agreement, at some specified mini-
mum. This is frequently coupled with a requirement that net
working capital shall be kept at or above a specified minimum,
the two conditions jointly forming an indirect control of the
amount of borrowing. It is evident that the second condition
is essential if the lender wishes to assure himself that the net
liquid assets of the debtor are to be preserved. Restrictions on
amounts permitted to be invested in fixed assets, on dividend
disbursements, and on salaries or bonuses paid to executives,
also commonly found in term loan agreements, represent en-
deavors to maintain liquidity and to prevent dissipation of the
cash coming to the business. Clearly, controls of borrowing
and of disbursements aim at preserving the borrower's equity
available in liquid form to discharge the loan when due.
Provisions Concerning Management
Sometimes major changes in management personnel and its
compensation are subjected to approval of the lending bank,
or changes in management are insisted upon as conditions of
granting loans. Often borrowing concerns are required to
maintain life insurance of specified amounts, with respect to
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and against the pledge of any assets without such permission.
While this does not give the lending bank the same protectionPractices and Techniques 79
principal managerial personnel, proceeds of which are assigned
to the lender. Such requirements are especially frequent in
RFC term loan agreements. Term loan agreements may also
require the owners of the borrowing enterprise to pledge stock
or grant proxies to vote stock—all with the aim of ensuring
that management shall be adequate during the life of the loan.
Provisions Concerning Books and Records
Nearly all banks insist, as a condition of making term loans,
the borrowers maintain adequate records and grant the lender
access to them, because only so is it possible to judge the merit
of the credit and watch its development. Moreover loan agree-
ments frequently require the debtor to submit certified annual
balance sheets and profit and loss statements, and semi-annual,
quarterly or even monthly figures. Some agreements ask for
the submission of financial budgets for periods of three or six
months in advance.
Provisions Pertaining to Acceleration of the Debt
Normally, the agreement provides that all debt becomes due
upon the default of any other debt of the borrower, upon
failure to fulfil the financial, management, or other provisions
of the loan agreement, upon filing of a voluntary or involun-
tary petition in bankruptcy, or upon suspension of operations
for causes other than strikes, as well as upon default in pay-
ment of interest or principal of the loan.
Provisions Respecting Collateral Security
If security has been required, the loan agreement specifies the
documents necessary, such as real estate mortgages or deeds
of trust, chattel mortgages, assignments of receivables or of
life insurance, or pledges of inventory. As has been noted,
practically all RFC loans and the great majority of Reserve
bank loans carry collateral security. In contrast, only about
40 percent of the number of medium-term credits of life in-
surance companies are collaterally secured. At mid-1941 corn-80 Term Lending to Business
mercial banks had taken security for 56 percent of the number
and 33 percent of the amount of term loans held by them.
Credit Standards
Experienced loan officers recognize that the distinction be-
tween an acceptable and an unacceptable credit rests upon the
evaluation and combination of so many diverse elements that
they never admit the use of any formula in judgiig credits.
They believe that one complex of circumstances appears to
justify a loan; another does not. If information were available,
term loan credit standards could be inferred from a compari-
son of the characteristics of loan applications accepted with
those of loans rejected. Still another method of determining
good credit standards would be to compare the characteristics
of loans that proved to be good with those that resulted in
These procedures present technical difficulties, and ex-
perience with term loans has been too limited to make them
feasible at the present time. It is nevertheless possible, through
conversations with many officers engaged in term lending, to
isolate the factors which are uppermost in their minds when
deciding whether to extend medium-term business credit. In
general, there are three major subjects with which a term lend-
ing institution may be concerned: (1) the borrowing enter-
prise, (2) the collateral security, if any, (3) other endorsers
of the obligation, if any. Sihce the credit standards of com-
mercial banks differ somewhat from those of insurance com-
panies and government agencies making term loans, it is con-
venient to deal with these institutions separately.
Commercial Banks
The credit standards applied most frequently by commercial
banks to term loans relate mainly to the circumstances of the
borrowing business, rather than to collateral security or en-
dorsers of a loan. In many cases where security has been taken
bThistype of study was made of a sample of consumer credits. See National
Bureau of Economic Research (Financial Research Program), Risk Elements in
Consumer Instalment Financing, by David Durand (1941).Practices and Techniques 81
itwas not conceived of as the major protection against loss,
but rather as a restriction upon further borrowing by the
debtor or as a moral stimulant to repayment. With respect to
44 percent of the number (67 percent of the amount) of term
loans, the lending bank relies for payment solely upon the
performance of the enterprise. In view of this dependence it
is commonly the case that term loan agreements require the
borrower to maintain his financial position at a level at least
as favorable as existed at the time of making the loan. In ad-
dition the lending institution provides, in the loan agreement,
for certain protective measures ifit appears that the bor-
rower's financial position is becoming unsatisfactory. These
include the acquisition of liens on assets and the acceleration
of the maturity of the note. However, although such meas-
ures are provided for, bankers generally do not rely upon the
value of assets to liquidate term indebtedness. They do not
desire to acquire through foreclosure property that they are
usually unequipped to operate or sell advantageously. Their
reliance is primarily upon the ability and desire of the debtor
to repay the loan out of earnings. Credit standards applied
by commercial banks to term loans therefore grow out of
standards traditionally applied to short-term loans, and relate
principally to the competence and moral character of the man-
agement, the concern's financial position at time of making
the loan, and its prospective earning power.
With respect to moral character, bankers universally insist
that the principals of a business, whether partners or impor-
tant officers or stockholders in a corporation, display an abso-
lutely "clean" record. In the case of large, well-established
corporations, good moral character of principals may usually
be taken for granted. No matter how impressive the present
and prospective financial position of the enterprise may be,
or how valuable the collateral pledged, term loans will not be
granted unless the banker is thoroughly satisfied of the bor-
rower's intention to repay his debts. This credit standard is
justifiably founded upon the experience that a dishonest or82 TermLending to Business
unscrupulous borrower will find some way of avoiding his
obligations, despite the strictest precautions taken by the
lender. It has always been applied in making short-dated loans,
but is considered particularly necessary in term lending, since
incompetence or lack of a sense of moral obligation has a
longer period to work out its effects.
There does not appear to be any uniform practice with re-
gard to the standards of present financial position. Commer-
cial banks are naturally unwilling to extend medium-term
credit to a concern encumbered with. so large an amount of
current obligations in proportion to its current assets that
financial embarrassment might follow promptly in the wake
of some untoward event, such as a plant shutdown or a sharp
decline in commodity prices. The familiar 2/1 ratio of current
assets to current liabilities has generally been applied as a
minimum standard in making term loans, although much
higher ratios are considered necessary for concerns subject to
rapid changes in asset valuations. Moreover, unless unusual
circumstances warrant it, bankers commonly refuse to extend
term credit to a business that has previously pleged its in-
ventory or receivables to another creditor. The pledge of these
assets is regarded as indicating a probability that, according
to conservative standards, the business has inadequate work-
ing capital. On the other hand, concerns that have previously
mortgaged their fixed assets are often granted term loans,
provided there is an adequate cushion of equity and an estab-
lished earning power.
Few banks like to see the aggregate debt of a company ex-
ceed the amount that the owners of the business have already
invested although in certain industries exceptions are recog-
nized. In industries wherein the values of fixed as well as cur-
rent assets are comparatively unstable, the ratio of equity to
debt is required to be considerably above 1/1. The financial
records of the borrowing concern are expected to show an
ability to earn the annual percentage on its invested capital
that is at least "normal" in its industry. Nevertheless, termPractices and Techniques 83
creditmay be granted to concerns with poor past perform-
ance, if it can be shown that the cause was incompetent man-
agenient or some other factor, since eliminated or rectified.
It is difficult to state precisely the objective standards of
probable future earning power that banks expect applicants
for term credit to meet. 'With certain exceptions, it may be
said that a borrower must demonstrate reasonable ability to
repay a loan out of available incoming cash, without liquida-
tion of essential assets, and within the maximum term estab-
lished by •the bank. This credit standard—ability to "throw
off" enough cash to liquidate the loan at maturity—is also
applicable to short-term lending, but since a short-term loan
can be liquidated out of collection of receivables, selling down
of inventories, or completion of special transactions, it does
not require an estimation of earning power over a period of
years. Medium-term loans thus present much more difficult
credit problems.
Risk inevitably increases with the term of a loan, and esti-
mates of future earning power diminish in accuracy the more
distant the date for which they are made. Establishment of
a maximum term of loans is thus an important method by
which a bank can limit its risks on term loans. Although some
banks do not have standards on this matter, many banks will
not make loans running over five years, a few banks limit term
to three or four years, and still other banks are willing to lend
for seven or even ten years. Accordingly, a business concern
might be able to secure credit from one institution but not
from another, upon demonstrating reasonable ability to pay
off a loan within, say, five years.
Standards concerning maximum term of loan have been par-
ticularly important in loans to oil producers for the purpose
of financing drilling operations. The producer customarily
pledges his present producing properties, or the oil produced
therefrom, as security for a loan. Many banks follow the prac-
tice of requiring borrowers to pay instalments amounting to
50 percent of the sums realized from sale of oil produced on84 Term Lending to Business
the pledged properties. Consequently, if a bank had a three-
year maximum term for its oil loans, the amount it would lend
on a given property would be less than if its maximum term
were five years, because the "throw-off" of cash would be less
during the shorter period. Restriction of oil production by
state conservation authorities also reduces the amount of
credit an oil producer can obtain by pledging a given property;
other things being equal, this causes pressure to lengthen the
term of oil loans.
Life Insurance Companies
Life insurance companies have participated in the medium-
term business credit market mainly through their private pur-
chases of securities from issuers, and, to a subordinate degree,
through mortgage loans to business concerns. Credit standards
applied by them in the private acquisition of corporate bonds
or notes have been the conventional ones long utilized by in-
vestment bankers, and need not be described herein. In mak-
ing mortgage loans on business properties, insurance com-
panies have utilized credit standards pertaining both to the
earning power of the borrowing business and to the value of
the pledged property.
The negotiation of agreements between business corpora-
tions and life insurance companies purchasing securities pri-
vately has been well and authoritatively described as follows :6
Securitiesto be privately placed are customarily offered by the
issuers or by agents or bankers on their behalf. Preliminary basic
terms are determined in conferences between the issuer and the pur-
chaser, and the transaction is then implemented by the negotiation
of a purchase agreement, the initial draft of which is customarily
prepared by the purchaser. Where practicable, the indenture or sup-
plemental indenture under which the securities are to be issued is
attached in draft form to the purchase agreement. If available time
does not permit this, the more important provisions of the proposed
indenture are summarized in an exhibit to the purchase agreement,
which provides that the indenture shall incorporate such terms and
6ChurchillRodgers, "Purchase by Life Insurance Companies of Securities
Privately Offered," Harvard Law Review, Vol. LII, No. 5 (March 1939).Practices and Techniques 85
shallotherwise be in a form satisfactory to both the issuer and the
purchaser. After the execution of the contract, the purchaser usually
prepares a list of documents essential to consummate the transaction,
and these documents are then prepared with the collaboration of all
parties.
In order to preserve the exempt charactey of the transac-
tion under the Securities Act, the number of buyers of the
issue must be rigorously limited. 'While the Securities and Ex-
change Commission has not announced a maximum number of
purchasers (any excess of which would make the transaction a
"public offering"), up to June 1940 as many as sixteen have
participated in the private purchase of an issue. Normally, a
separate purchase contract is entered into by the issuer with
each buyer.
For many years legislation has restricted insurance com-
panies to the making of loans secured by real estate mort-
gages, the loans not exceeding two-thirds of the appraised
value of the collateral. Up to recent years, practically all such
loans have been made to borrowers pledging residential prop-
erty, farm land, or non-specialized urban property such as
office buildings, stores and lofts. For all of these properties
there was a comparatively broad market. The credit problem
in lending against them was exclusively one of appraising the
security, and not one of evaluating the financial strength of
the borrower. In extending credit to business concerns secured
by mortgages on industrial plants and other "special purpose"
properties, insurance companies have necessarily modified their
earlier credit standards to the extent of appraising the current
and prospective financial strength of borrowers. One large
company has created a separate department for making "spe-
cial purpose" mortgage loans. Before any such loan is ap-
proved, it must pass the scrutiny of the real estate department,
which seeks to determine whether the value of the collateral
is adequate to warrant the loan, and of the security depart-
ment, which must be .satisfled that the loan can be amortized
out of the borrower's earnings. This dual test is designed to
provide two sources from which repayment could be secured.86 Term Lending to Business
Reconstruction Finance Corporation7
The Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act limits loans to
business enterprises by the following principal conditions :8
(a)Capital or credit, at prevailing rates for the character
of loan applied for, must not be otherwise available.
(b) Al credits must be "of such sound value, or so secured,
as reasonably to assure retirement or repayment."
(c) Disbursements of loans can be made only when the
borrowing enterprise is "solvent."
(d) Loans may be made only when they offer reasonable
assurance of continued or increased employment of labor by
the applicant.
Except for cases where local banking facilities were inade-
quate, it follows from condition (a) that the credit standards
of the RFC were required to differ from those of private
institutions. Since loans of "sound value" would in all likeli-
hood be made by private lending institutions, condition (b)
in effect requires that RFC loans be secured. Hence, relatively
greater emphasis is necessarily placed by the RFC upon the
value of collateral security pledged by the debtor.
There have been few, if any, business loans made without
commercial bank participation that could have been made by
commercial banks if they applied the usual term credit stand-
ards. The RFC assured itself that credit was "not otherwise
available" to an applicant by offering a prospective loan or a
participation therein to the bank with which the applicant had
customarily dealt. In some cases where such a bank declined
to grant credit it is possible that another bank would have
made or participated in a loan, but this appears unlikely in
view of the financial characteristics of loan applicants. The
majority of RFC loan applicants had very inadequate work-
ing capital. In few cases were their current ratios as high as
2/1, and several applicants had current ratios less than 1/1.
7This discussion is based upon a detailed review of a random sample of
40 business loan applications authorized by the RFC, and 40 loan applications
rejected.
8SeeReconstruction Finance Corporation, Circular No. 13, revised (Wash-
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Ratios of borrowers' debts to net worth not infrequently ex-
ceeded 1/1, even on the undoubtedly generous valuations of
assets contained in balance sheets submitted by loan applicants.
Moreover, the operations of applicants usually had resulted
in losses. during the majority of years immediately preceding
the dates of their applications. Nearly every applicant was
heavily in debt to banks, trade creditors, stockholders or sup-
pliers of equipment. As a group, concerns borrowing from the
RFC have indeed been "substandard" from a bank credit point
of view; loans to these concerns would have involved greater
risks than commercial banks could have taken. It was, of
course, precisely this class of enterprise that the RFC was
given the difficult assignment of assisting.
In cases where a borrowing concern pledged real estate to
the RFC as primary security for a loan, it appears that a
ratio of 1/1 between borrowers' net worth and the amount
of the loan was regarded as a minimum. Where the primary
security consisted of inventory, the maximum loan was nor-
mally two-thirds of the cost value. If assigned open accounts
receivable constituted the primary security, the ratio of face
value of accounts to the RFC loan disbursement was a
minimum of In a number of cases the RFC authorized
loans of certain amounts on the deposit of mortgages on real
estate or chattels, and authorized additional disbursements
when and as assignments of acceptable receivables with face
value 150 percent as large as the additional loans were made
by the borrower.
Federal Reserve Banks9
Credit standards applied by Federal Reserve banks in passing
upon applications for industfial loans have been similar to
those of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation in many
9This discussion is based upon published reports of the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System and of the several Federa! Reserve banks, as
well as information secured through questionnaires circulated among Federal
Reserve banks and an examination of credit files of the Federal Reserve Banks
of New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia.88 Term Lending to Business
respects. These standards have been shaped in the light of the
following statutory restrictions upon Reserve bank loans:
(a) The borrowing concern must be "an established busi-
ness" located within the district of the lending Reserve bank.
(b) The borrower must be unable to obtain "requisite
financialassistance on a reasonable basis from the usual
sources."
(c) The loan must be used for "working capital purposes."
(d) The term of the loan may not exceed five years.
Condition (b) carries the implication that the credit standards
applied by the Reserve banks must differ from those of com-
mercial banks, unless Reserve bank lending is to be confined
to communities wherein private banking facilities are lacking,
which has not been the case. It has the same effect as the
analogous provisions in the RFC Act. But the limitations on
term of loans and use of funds by borrowers are much more
rigorous than those prescribed for the RFC. Since Reserve
bank credit may not be used for plant expansion or refunding,
Reserve banks must ensure that borrowers actually use loan
proceeds for working capital.
Analysis of the financial characteristics of applicants for in-
dustrial advances of the Federal Reserve banks discloses that
their financial condition by the end of 1933 was somewhat
poorer than that of the average business concern of com-
parable size. They experienced greater declines in sales during
the 1929-3 2 contraction period than did average concerns in
the same industries, were less likely to show a profit, were
more heavily indebted both on long and short term, operated
with smaller inventories relative to total assets, and displayed
signs of possessing insufficient working capital. About a third
of all applicants were approved for an industrial advance, the
approved applicants being somewhat larger, more heavily
weighed by manufacturing concerns, less heavily indebted,
and containing more numerous cases of expanding sales, than
the rejected applicants.'0
'-°SeeNational Bureau of Economic Research (Financial Research Program),
Capital and Credit Requirements of Federal Reser've Bank Industrzal Loan Ap-
plicants, by Charles L. Merwin and Charles H. Schmidt (ms. 1941).Practices and Techniques 89
Because they deal with concerns financially less resistant to
adversity, Reserve banks necessarily place relatively greater
emphasis on collateral security. First mortgages on plant and
equipment, assignment of accounts receivable, pledge of in-
ventory, assignment of cash values of life insurance, and en-
dorsements of principal officers or stockholders have all been
sought by Reserve banks to bolster their positions and lessen
the probability of loss. Appraisal of these assets has been
given more weight than commercial bankers usually allow in
determining whether credit should be granted. In some cases,
Reserve banks have made term loans of given amount on the
security of fixed assets, and, in addition, have extended short-
term credits against the assigned accounts receivable of a bor-
rower to meet his temporary credit needs. In such cases, the
standard ratio of face value of pledged receivables to the
amount of the loan was
Credit Appraisal Methods"
The particular credit standards applied in making term
loans have been accompanied by the use of special methods
of credit appraisal. In extending medium-term credit, bankers
look beyond seasonal or temporary business transactions of
the borrower, and expand their credit investigations beyond
the limits that are usually set in making short-term loans. The
influence of business cycles and of long-term economic forces
upon thefinancialposition of the borroweriscarefully
weighed. Moreover, term credit analysis, although strongly
resembling that used by investment bankers, differs from the
techniques appliedto public issues of corporate bonds or notes.
As term loans and debt securities privately purchased from
issuing concerns are not marketable assets, lenders cannot look
to factors directly affecting market prices, except where the
borrowing concern has a similar issue of securities outstanding
in the hands of the public. Since a lending institution often
cannot look to a public market for a continuing appraisal of
"This section is based upon numerous interviews held by the authors with
officers of lending institutions in charge of term lending operations.90 TermLending to Business
the borrower's credit or the liquidation of a loan, it must
increase its requirements with respect to quality and augment
the care with which it scrutinizes such credits.
In their broad outlines, credit appraisal techniques used by
Federal Reserve banks and the Reconstruction Finance Cor-
poration have not differed from those of commercial banks or
insurance companies. A term loan credit analysis conducted by
any type of institution may include the following steps:
1. Acquisition and analysis of credit information obtained
from mercantile agencies, competitors, customers or suppliers
of the applicant.
2. Acquisition and analysis of financial statements of the
applicant extending over the most recent seven, ten, or more
years.
3. A survey and report, often by an "outside" engineer,
upon the physical condition and technical efficiency of the ap-
plicant's plant and equipment, and his costs of production in
comparison with those of other concerns in the same industry.
The fact that most banks in term lending have extended credit
only to prime or near-prime risks has made for less elaborate
investigation. But when term lending becomes more general,
engineering reports, etc., may be more widely used.
4. A survey and report, sometimes by retained merchandis-
ing experts, upon the market for the applicant's products and
upon the effectiveness of his sales promotional and advertising
methods.
5.Preparationof an organized file or report embodying
all of the preceding data, together with the conclusions and
recommendations of the loan officers in charge of the matter.
This document is intended for review by the discount com-
mittee or board of directors of the lending institution.
Such an analysis represents the maximum scope of an in-
vestigation and is not to be considered typical. The different
components do not form part of the routine of all term lend-
ing institutions, are not applied to all term loans, and are not
necessarily taken consecutively, Most banks have not devel-
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a"full dress" credit investigation do so only for loan appli-
cations that, because of exceptionally large amount, mediocre
financial position of the applicant, or unusual nature of the
applicant's business, require a very careful appraisal. In fact,
the majority of large banks have long possessed files of infor-
mation concerning important business enterprises, and are in
a position to render credit decisions prior to making investiga-
tions or formulating the specific provisions of loan agree-
ments. Obviously, a detailed procedure is only justified with
respect to loans yielding a large enough gross income to
defray relatively high costs of administration. Loans may
yield comparatively large gross income because they carry
high interest rates or because they are large in size.
Whatever its scope, the broad purposes of a term loan
credit investigation are twofold: first, to estimate the proba-
bility that the applicant will repay the loan at all; and second,
to determine the period of time within which he will be able
to extinguish the debt. Since this period is necessarily more
than one year, the financial position of the borrower must be
forecast for several years in advance and not merely through
the seasons of a year.
After a banker has satisfied himself, through his own ex-
perience and knowledge as well as through checks made with
mercantile agencies, competitors, suppliers or customers of the
applicant, regarding the integrity and responsibility of the
principals of a business, his next task is to appraise the indus-
trial strength of the enterprise. The salient questions in his
mind are likely to be: Is the industry of which this firm is a
member experiencing long-term growth, or is it subject to such
basically adverse shifts in costs of production and demand
for its products that even the best management will have diffi-
culty in overcoming them? Furthermore, even if the industry
as a whole is likely at least to hold its own in the economy
during the life of the loan, has the applicant concern a well-
established place in that industry? An answer to the first ques-
tion can he found through general industrial analysis in which
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servations of fundamental economic trends. To this end, some
banks have made comprehensive industrial studies, utilized in
connection with all loan applications coming from members
of a particular industry. A solution to the second question may
be deduced by considering the competitive position of the ap-
plicant in relation to other enterprises in the industry, espe-
cially with regard to costs of production and public acceptance
of the product.
It is in connection with this latter question that an appraisal
of management becomes crucial. The ability of an enterprise
to hold its own or to make progress in a changing economic
environment depends to a large extent upon the competence
of its management in relation to those of competitors. No
lender can possibly foresee all the future circumstances that
will affect the fortunes of the borrower. But if he has satisfied
himself of the superior ability of the management, he can
reasonably expect that appropriate adjustments will be made.
Appraisal of management is the touchstone of term credit
analysis.'2 While one pragmatic test of managerial ability is
the concern's record of profitability, revealed by financial
statements, many bankers also secure brief biographies of di-
rectors and principal officers, and study changes in directing
and operating personnel for the purpose of measuring the sta-
bility of management and its freedom from internal dissension.
To this end, some banks set up year-by-year listings of di-
rectors, officers, and principal stockholders covering periods
up to ten years.
Nearly all lending institutions require an applicant to sub-
mit comparative financial statements, both balance sheets and
profit-and-loss accounts, extending over the most recent seven
or more years. These data are then frequently transcribed on
special analytical forms, facilitating a year-by-year comparison
of the financial position of the concern. Itis common for
bankers to make a sources-and-application-of-funds analysis,
utilizing balance sheets at the ends of successive years, for the
12Asone banker stated to the authors: "Bad management can't wreck a good
business so badly that it won't be able to pay off its six-month note, but it can
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purpose of determining the nature and magnitude of changes
in the financial structure of the concern, and to indicate what
reductions of particular assets or increases in certain liabilities
("sources" of funds) were made for the purpose of increasing
other assets or reducing other liabilities("applications" of
funds).
Such analysis is generally directed to a calculation of the
normal annual earning power of a business, and more par-
ticularly to its annual cash gain. The latter amount may be
used as a measure of the ability of a concern to "throw off"
cash annually in repayment of a term loan, and often deter-
mines whether or not a loan is to be granted, and if so, the
term of the credit. As a rough measure of the annual cash
"throw-off," which gauges the ability of the borrower to make
periodical repayments, many banks use the annual net income
before depreciation allowances, sometimes adjusting itfor
capital needs of the business and income tax requirements.
From balance sheets and income-and-expense statements,
financial ratios for each year-end or semi-annual period are
also computed, such as current assets to current liabilities,
debt to net worth, net earnings to invested capital, sales to
inventory, sales to fixed assets, and many others, Such ratios
may only indicate the temporal progress of the concern
but also, through comparison with "normal" ratios of the
industry of which it is a member, throw light upon the con-
cern's competitive position.13
No matter how skillfully and ingeniously performed finan-
cial statement analysis has limitations as a technique of credit
appraisal. Fundamentally it is a systematic survey of the his-
torical record of the concern, and does not necessarily signal
the course of future development, although it has evidential
value. Recognizing this, bankers supplement it with other de-
vices. Frequently they require financial budgets from an ap-
plicant, indicating how the proceeds of the loan will be utilized,
13Averagefinancia' ratios for many different industries have been computed
by Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., and the Robert Morris Associates, and appear in
the Survey of American Listed Corporations, published by the Securities and
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and serving as a standard against which subsequent perform-
ance may be compared. In adition, as indicated above, they
seek to assess the physical condition and operating efficiency
of the borrower's producing properties, the character of the
market for his products, and the effectiveness of his sales pro-
motional and advertising methods.
In passing upon larger term loans, it is not uncommon for
bankers to seek the opinions of independent experts, as in-
vestment bankers long have done. This occurs with particular
frequency in the making of loans to oil producers, since the
banker, usually relying to an important degree upon the value
of the producing properties pledged by the borrower, faces a
highly technical problem of valuation. In valuing such col-
lateral, a bank usually secures an opinion from an independent
petroleum geologist, familiar with the geological structures of
the territory, regarding the probable amount of potentially
recoverable oil reserve in the ground. From a petroleum en-
gineer the bank then procures an estimate of the costs of re-
covering this oil, the amounts of periodical recovery, and the
selling price per barrel; from all of these data probable annual
net incomes may be estimated. By discounting these future net
incomes to the present, through use of an appropriate dis-
count factor, the present value of the pledged property may
be estimated. Some banks operating extensively in this field
employ their own full-time experts, and at least one large com-
mercial bank maintains a department of petroleum economics,
staffed by a geologist, a petroleum engineer, and a petroleum
economist. The making of term loans on coal or natural gas
properties involves the use of analogous procedures.
All the data collected during the course of a term loan in-
vestigation are usually organized into a formal report, similar
in content to the reports of underwriting investigations made
by investment bankers. These documents, comprising a hun-
dred or more typewritten pages with respect to a loan of
large size to a borrower in an unfamiliar industry, are studied
by the loan committee or board of directors of the lending
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passingon thousands of comparatively small loan applications,
is to summarize the date in a "review committee report" of
about ten or fifteen pages, which is submitted to the board of
directors for action. In a small bank which has only a few
loan executives, each of whom has intimate knowledge of the
business enterprises in the community, formal presentation of
a report upon a loan application may often be dispensed with.
Supervising Active Term Loans
The task of term loan administration is not complete when
the executives of the lending institution have authorized dis-
bursement of money to the borrower. Apart from the neces-
sary accounting routines of collecting interest and instalments
of principal on or before their due dates, lenders usually make
a continuing analysis of the financial progress of the indebted
business. In order to secure information that will make such
analysis possible, many banks write into term loan agreements
or have understandings, with their borrowers that monthly,
quarterly or semi-annual financial information will be fur-
nished. In addition, some lending institutions request monthly
budgets for periods of three to six months in advance, so that
loan officers can be apprised of the business plans of the bor-
rower and can judge the degree to which those plans are
adhered to. Banking practice calls for a periodical review of
each loan, in the light of all the factual information coming
into the borrower's credit file, so that violations of the loan
agreement may be promptly detected or any developments
inimical to the interests of the bank (or the borrower) may
be drawn to the borrower's attention and corrected.
It is the regular practice of many banks to have a repre-
sentative visit the place of business of the borrower period-
ically, to discuss his new products and his production or
keting plans and problems. Out of such meetings often emerge
suggestions valuable to the business executive as well as in-
formation of use to the banker. The objectives of such follow-
up activities are to assure discharge of the provisions of the
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with the borrowing concern regarding its future credit re-
quirements.
Relation of Term Loans
to Other Assets of Commercial Banks
The estimated $2,162 million of term loans held by all
American banks at the end of 1940 comprised about 12 per-
cent of total loans and discounts of all kinds. Term loans
were, nevertheless, relatively much more important to com-
mercial banks as a form of direct business credit than this
figure indicates. They comprised no less than 32 percent of
the "commercial and industrial" loans held by commercial
banks, a loan category which includes most business loans but
excludes open market paper, agricultural and real estate loans,
loans to banks, loans to brokers, dealers and individuals col-
lateralized by securities, personal loans and loans to financial
institutions (other than instalment financing companies) and
nonprofit organizations.14
While term loans hold an increasingly significant position
among the loans of all commercial banks, they are even more
important components of the loans of large banks. As has
already been observed, large banks engage in extending term
credit with greater frequency and tend to accumulate larger
amounts of term loans in proportion to their deposits or assets
than do smaller institutions. Table 12 gives the percentages of
term loans to all loans and discounts held by a sample of fifty
large commercial banks, classified into size groups according
to loans and discounts held. Collectively, these banks held
about $800 million of term loans which formed 22 percent of
their total loans and discounts; for five large banks term loans
were 30 percent or more of all loans and discounts. It appears
SeeInstructions for the Preparation of Reports of Condition by State Bank
Members of the Federal Reserve System (Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, Washington, 1938 Revision) pp. 11-13, About 83 percent of the
number and 94 percent of the amount of all term loans held by the sample of
99 commercial banks used in this study (see Appendix A) were classified as
"commercial and industrial loans" in reports of condition submitted to bank
supervisory authorities. About 41 percent of the number and 63 percent of the
amount of even those loans secured by real estate, at least in part, were so
classified, although banks are instructed to report these as "real estate loans."Practices and Techniques 97
Number of Ranks Having
Percentage of
Term Loans to












Less than 5 percent 6 4 7 1 1 1 20
5—10 percent 1 3 3 2 .. .. 9
10—20 percent 1 2 4 4 1 . 12
20—30 percent •. .. 2 .. 1 1 4
30 percent and over .. .. 1 1 1 2 5
TOTAL NUMBER 8 9 17 8 4 4 50
occurred in the credit relationships between larger banks and
business enterprises during the past decade. Table 12 indi-
cates great dispersion in the relation of term credit to total
loans among large commercial banks, although there is a tend-
ency for the largest term-lending banks to have relatively
larger fractions of their loan portfolios in the form of term
loans than is the case for smaller institutions in the group.'6
The lengthening of the maturities of bank credit extended
to business has been a matter of concern to a number of bank-
ers. Other things being equal, loans of medium term undeni-
ably carry larger risks to lenders than do loans of short term.
Moreover, term loans are less liquid assets in several respects
Table 12—CLASSIFICATION OF 50 COMMERCIAL BANKS BY
SIZE AND BY PERCENTAGE OF TERM LOANS TO TOTAL
LOANS AND DlscouNTsa
a NationalBureau sample of 50 commercial banks having some term loans outstand-
ing at the end of 1940. Size of bank measured by loans and discounts as of June 30,
1941.
likely that term loans to business
far from two-thirds of the amount
trial" loans in the portfolios of the
end of 1940—a striking reflection
enterprises comprised not
of "commercial and indus-
se fifty large banks at the
of the changes that have
than either short-term
securities. Consequently
active in term lending
loans or investments in marketable
bankers whose institutions have been
have given thought to the maximum
15 Totalassets or total deposits would have formed a preferable measure of
size of these banks, but this information was not available.98 Term Lending to Business
amount of term credit their banks should have outstanding;
a few of, them have laid down rules-of-thumb limiting out-
standing term loans to fixed amounts or to certain percentages
of total assets, total deposits, time deposits, or bank capital.
There is an understanding in one bank, for example, that out-
standing term loans shall not exceed 10 percent of total assets,
which would normally be about 30 percent of total
The industrial character of its territory and the attitudes
and training of its personnel are major factors in determining
the aggregate amount of term loans a bank can develop. Given
these factors, bankers consider the following points in deciding
the proper amount of term credit they should have outstand-
ing at any one time:
1. The de9ree of stability in turnover of deposits. Banks
possessing a comparatively high degree of stability in the rate
of turnover of their deposits obviously are better able to
increase medium-term loans, other things being equal, than
institutions that faceerratic flows of cash.
2. The ratio of capital to deposits. Since term loans are
assets with less liquidity than cash or government securities, a
bank with a comparatively small capital "cushion" under its
deposits will tend to limit term lending more rigorously, other
things being equal, than one which has comparatively large
capital out of which losses could be met.
3. The quality and maturities of other assets. Institutions
holding relatively large amounts of long-term bonds, particu-
larly issues of less than prime quality or issues with poor mar-
ketability, more severely limit the amount of their term loans,
other things being the same, than banks whose other assets
consist in relatively large measure of highly liquid, prime-
quality, or short-term obligations. Conversely, banks that have
acquired relatively large portfolios of term loans have re-
adjusted the qualities and maturities of securities in their
18Itmay be noted, in passing, that American banking legislation has im-
posed certain limits upon the amounts of credit of given type that banks may
have outstanding. For example, a national bank may not have loans outstanding
secured by real estate of an amount greater than 60 percent of its capital or
surplus, or the sum of its time deposits, whichever is greater.Practices and Techniques 99
investment portfolios in order to bring about the desired dis-
tributions of their total earning assets.
DiversifIcation of Term Loans
American banking laws and bank supervisory authorities
have long required some degree of diversification in the loans
of commercial banks. The National Bank Act did so by im-
plication when it limited the amount of credit obtainable by
any one borrower to not more than 10 percent of a bank's
capital and surplus. State banking laws commonly contain
somewhat similar provisions. In practice, few banks are willing
to make term loans up to their legal limits, preferring to sell
participations or to seek the cooperation of other lenders in
very large loans. While statutory limitations on loans to single
borrowers have frequently made it necessary for banks to
cooperate in term lending, there are many cases where co-
operation has occurred only because self-imposed rules of
banks restricted the amounts of individual loans they would
make to considerably less than the amounts allowed by law..
The well-developed facilities for cooperation among lenders
in the medium-term business credit market, to which reference
has been made previously, make it possible for any bank con-
fronted with an application for a loan larger than permitted
by the law or its own policy to invite other institutions to
share the risks.
Apart from diversifying their term loans among borrowers,
commercial banks generally seek to spread risks among in-
dustries. Few, if any, banks have adopted specific formulae of
industrial diversification. In fact, some banks have placed rela-
tively large. amounts of term credit in those few industries
for which their past experience has developed an unusual, ca-
pacity for the appraisal of credit risks. There is a tendency
for commercial banks to become specialists in extending me-
dium-term credit to concerns in particular industries, just as
certain investment banking houses have become industrial spe-
cialists. Industrial specialization in originating term loans is
not, of course, necessarily accompanied by similar specializa-100 TermLending to Business
tion in the loan portfolio. Such a bank may offer other
institutions participations in its loans, receiving from them, in
turn, opportunities to participate in loans made to concerns
in many industries.
Term Loan Reserves
Among a large number of banks located in major financial
centers of the United States, with whose officers the question
was discussed, no bank had created a special reserve to meet
losses from term loans. Traditional American banking prac-
tice has been to set up out of earnings a general "reserve for
contingencies" against which is charged losses realized upon
the disposition of any of assets. When a particular loan
is criticized by a bank-examining authority and classified as
"doubtful" in value, a bank generally sets up a special reserve
against the prospective ioss on that specific loan. It is very
uncommon for banks to maintain reserves for single classes of
loans, with one major exception: A growing number of banks
are creating special reserves against losses from consumer
instalment credits, by setting aside out of earnings one-half
percent (more or less) of the annual volume of such loans
until the reserve is built up to a point deemed adequate to
cover losses that may accrue in the future.
While bankers generally recognize that loss in term lend-
ing is a real contingency, there are certain difficulties in estab-
lishing reserves for term loans. The chief of these difficulties
is lack of knowledge of the "normal" ratio of losses to volume
of term credit extended. In extending consumer instalment
credit, banks engage in a large number of comparatively small
transactions, each completed within a short period of time. As
a result, there accumulates a volume of experience adequate to
form the basis for a reasonably accurate judgment concerning
the normal loss ratio. In term lending, on the other hand,
comparatively few loans are made but they are of large
amounts and extend for long periods. Thus, the fund of ex-
perience is as yet too limited to permit of a scientific solution
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Theexperience of financial institutions in holding small
corporate bond issues during the period 1922-28 has some
evidential value with respect to term loans, but cannot be re-
garded as determinative of the probable term loan loss ratio
because of many differences in characteristics and circum-
stances under which these credits were granted. After survey-
ing the default and loss record of some 385 public issues of
corporate bonds of $5 million or less during this period, one
investigator concluded that at least 1 percent of the unpaid
balances of term loans should annually be set aside out of
earnings as a minimum reserve for eventual losses.'7 Since the
weighted average interest rate charged by commercial banks
on term loans during the first six months of 1941 was about 2.5
percent per annum, adoption of this suggestion would absorb
about 40 percent of the gross income from term lending.
A further difficulty of establishing special term loan re-
serves, often cited, is that the process of accumulation would
bear especially hard on the net profitability of term lending in
view of present rates on term loans, and would impair the
ability of banks to build up capital commensurate with increas-
ing deposit liabilities. The latter follows from the fact that, al-
though there is no uniform policy on this point, bank super-
visory agencies do not generally include loss reserves as part
of a bank's net sound capital. It may be observed, however,
that if some losses do occur in the normal course of term
lending operations, capital positions and bank earnings would
undergo more severe and less convenient readjustments in the
absence of a reserve than if a reserve had gradually been
accumulated to absorb the shock of large, sudden losses. The
amount of any term loan reserve would necessarily be geared
to losses resulting from individual cases of misfortune or bad
judgment. The current earning position of a bank could never
be protected against catastrophes resulting from such power-
ful adverse forces as affected the whole economic structure
during 1929-33.
Reportof L. Merle Hostetler prepared for the National City Bank of
Cleveland, Ohio, dted by Albert Wagenfuehr, cit.